WHOSE LINE IS IT ANYWAY? THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
CABLE OPEN ACCESS

Harold Feld*

Cable companies (generally known as "multisystems operators" or "MSOs") have begun a
lengthy process of upgrading their facilities to
support high-speed Internet service, called
"broadband." The cable MSOs have opposed federal and local efforts to open their cable networks
to non-affiliated internet service providers
("ISPs") who wish to provide broadband access independent of the cable MSO that owns the network. Leading the cable resistance has been
AT&T Corporation. In 1998, AT&T acquired the
largest existing cable MSO, Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI"). From the minute AT&T filed
with the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") for permission to consummate the
merger, it has faced demands from competitors,
consumer groups, and local franchising authorities to provide "open access" to its cable network
on nondiscriminatory terms.
In response, AT&T (and its supporters in the
cable industry) have consistently responded that
cable MSOs have the right to offer internet services through an exclusive provider. AT&T offers
broadband access through an exclusive contract
with Excite@Home, Inc. ("@Home"). 1 Although
the FCC declined to impose an open access provision on AT&T as a condition of its acquisition of
TCI, the City of Portland imposed open access as
a condition on the transfer of TCI's Portland
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1 Although @Home is a joint venture among several
cable MSOs, AT&T holds a controlling interest. See How Do

franchise to AT&T. AT&T brought suit in federal
district court, lost before the district court and
promptly filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The AT&T case is the most advanced case addressing the issue of open access and the question
as to whether requiring a cable MSO offering
broadband services to provide a choice of ISPs on
a nondiscriminatory basis offends a cable MSO's
First Amendment right to offer a unique "repertoire" of programming. 2 In other words, is the
First Amendment a shield against any effort to
open the cable network? As discussed below,
rather than a shield against an open access requirement, the First Amendment serves as a sword
of compelling state interest, justifying an open access requirement.
In its case against the City of Portland, AT&T
has argued that its position as an internet access
provider subjects any attempt to regulate its internet access to the "strict scrutiny" standard, traditionally reserved for newspapers but recently applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate content
restrictions on the internet." Alternatively, AT&T
argues that the Turner decisions 4 require that all
regulation of cable services must survive intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. Furthermore, AT&T claims that an open access requirement would burden its rights as a speaker by
AT&7, Excite@Home, Fit Together, SAN

JOSE MERCURY NEWS,

Aug. 11, 1999, at A].
2 Another case is pending in Broward County, Florida at
the district court level, involving a number of cable MSOs. See
Open Access Lawsuit Closed, WIRED

NEWS,

Feb. 15,

2000

<www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34365,00.html> (report that district court dismissed all but the First Amendment
counts of the complaint).
- See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
4 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994) [hereinafter Turner /]; Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner 1/].

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

forcing it to carry the speech of others and thus,
regardless of its status as an internet access/cable
provider, such a requirement would trigger strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment.
As demonstrated below, an MSO's status as an
internet access or cable provider does not award it
any special First Amendment protection in this
context. AT&T's offering of internet access,
whether classified as a "cable service" or a "telecommunications service" under the Communications Act, 5 should be treated as a common carrier

service from a First Amendment point of view.
None of the concerns exist here that caused the
Supreme Court in Turner to treat cable services as

members of the "press" engaged in First Amendment activity.6
Because an MSO such as AT&T provides subscribers full access to the "public" internet
through its service, it cannot claim that an open
access requirement amounts to "forced speech."
The nature of the internet does not support this
assertion. For example, the requirement that a
subscriber affirmatively select an alternate ISP
guarantees that the subscriber cannot reasonably
impute any offensive speech to the MSO.
Conceptually, an open access requirement
amounts to a "virtual easement" over the cable
plant. It does not interfere with an MSO's general
enjoyment of its cable property or its ability to offer its full range of speech and services. Indeed, in
this regard, it is similar to state-imposed easements over shopping centers and other areas in
which the property owner has invited the public.
The Supreme Court has found such state-imposed
easements that promote the First Amendment
rights of others to speak and hear information
from diverse sources Constitutional in physical
space. 7 Given that the cable franchise carries with
5 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714)
6 This proposition is dependent on the condition that
open access requirement would not reduce the number of
channels available to an MSO to offer its own choice of cable

and internet services. See infra Part III.A.
7 See Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S.
74 (1980).
8

See, e.g., Cass S. Sunstein, A New Deal For Speech, 17
& ENT. L.J. 138 (1994).
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9 Such an argument is not inconceivable. See Preferred
Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the city's grant of an exclusive
cable franchise violated a potential franchisee's First Amendment right unless the city could show that physical limitations
made an exclusive franchise necessary). In addition, federal
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it use of the public right of way, there seems no
reason to demand a similar easement, and no reason why it should be unconstitutional, in cyberspace. A virtual easement to promote competition
and the public's access to choices of information
provider seems a reasonable condition for the locality to impose in exchange for the right to lay
cable line through the public streets and run
cable service to the home.
More fundamentally, rather than violating the
First Amendment, an open access requirement effectuates the purpose of the First Amendment: to
provide American citizens with access to-and the
ability to participate in-the broadest marketplace of ideas possible. 8 Absent government intervention, this First Amendment purpose does not
necessarily imply a general right of access to cable
networks under the First Amendment. 9 The First
Amendment does, however, authorize both the
federal government and local franchising authorities to impose open access conditions, even under
some degree of scrutiny.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Broadband in the Existing Internet and the
"Next Generation Internet"

"Broadband"-high speed internet access capable of delivering video streaming, local telephone
service and a host of other wonders-promises to
revolutionize the internet. 10 The FCC has defined
"broadband" as internet access at speeds of at
least 200 kilobits/second (kbps). I I By contrast,
conventional dialup or "narrowband" serviceusually involving a local phone call to an internet
service provider-is limited to speeds of approximately 28.8 or 56 kbps.12 Speed of connection to
or state statutes governing antitrust and prohibiting anticompetitive behavior might require cable MSOs to provide open
access to their networks to competing ISPs.
It
LEASE

See Kevin Werbach, The Architecture of Internet 2.0, RE-

1.0, Feb. 1999, at 1 [hereinafter WERBACH].

II See In re Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced
Telecomm. Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and
Timely Fashion, Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, 2406, para. 20
(1999) [hereinafter Advanced Services Report].
12 See generally FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER 29, DIGITAL
TORNADO:

THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

POLICY

(authored by Kevin Werbach) (1997) [hereinafter DIGITAL
TORNADO]; Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future In Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAw CONSPEcTUS 37 (1999);
FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER 31, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET (authored by Jason Oxman) (1999)
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the end-user, or "bandwidth" at the "last mile," is
a critical bottleneck in the delivery of internet
services. Imagine the internet as coming through
a funnel, with the narrow point at the end-user.
The size of the hole determines the speed at
which water comes through. The larger the hole
(i.e., the greater the bandwidth), the faster the in3
formation moves from the internet to the user.'
Because dial-up access has evolved over the past
30 years in the context of the telephone network,
a substantial body of law exists requiring telephony networks to provide "open access" to internet
service providers.' 4 The common carrier telephone networks must carry the traffic of any ISP
under nondiscriminatory terms, even where the
telephone network itself provides internet service.
As a result, individuals have a wide choice of ISPs
offering a variety of services. 1 5 More than 6,000
ISPs offer dial up services' 6 to the nearly 100 million Americans who are on line.' 7 More than
ninety-five percent of Americans live within the local calling area of four or more ISPs,1s with average costs less than $20 per month for unlimited
internet access. '9

This open access regime has permitted the development of an unusually competitive and robust
market in which consumer choice prevents even
the largest ISPs from dominating the market. As a
[hereinafter
13

UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET].

See FCC CABLE SERVICES BUREAU, BROADBAND TODAY:

INDUSTRY MONITORING SESSIONS 19 (staff report authored by
Deborah A. Lathen) (1999) [hereinafter BROADBAND ToDAY].

14

See UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET, supra note 12, at

18-20.
15
See id. at 5 (crediting open access to the telephone network as the key to the explosive growth of the internet).
10 See id. at 17.
17
See NUA Ltd., How Many Online?, NUA INTERNET
SURVEYS (visited Nov. 8, 1999) <www.nua.ie/surveys/
howmany_online/index.html>.

18

See

UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET,

supra note 12, at

17. Although nothing prevents an individual from using dialup access outside a local calling area, the economics of the
telephone system make such access prohibitively expensive.
Consumers pay a flat rate for unlimited local calls, whereas
long-distance calls are paid for on a metered per-minute basis. As a practical matter, therefore, an individual's choice of
ISPs is generally limited to those that maintain a point of
presence ("POP") in the local calling area. See id. at n.47.
19 See id. at 5.
20
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
21
See, e.g., UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET, supra note
12, at 4; NUA Ltd., Net Economy Worth U.S. $507 Billion by
2000, NUA INTERNET SURVEYS, Oct. 27, 1999 <www.nua.ie/
surveys/>.
22 See, e.g., BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 10, at 25-29;

result, the content of the internet has become "as
diverse as human thought."'

21

Individuals enjoy a

wide range of services and the ability to interact
freely with each other and with purveyors of
goods and services online. It is no exaggeration to
say that the development of the internet has fundamentally altered the way Americans speak, lis2
ten, work, shop and play. '
The advent of broadband, primarily deployed
to residential users through cable systems with no
history of common carrier or open access regulation, threatens to change all of this. Although
common carriers have begun to deploy broadband services through open networks, cable companies have taken a commanding lead. 2 Unlike
telephone companies, cable companies generally
do not need to provide access to their networks to
competitors. 23 As a result, cable companies that
provide two-way communications services and internet access need not provide subscribers with a
choice of ISP. Rather, a cable system operator can
require any subscriber who wishes to use its cable
system for broadband services to subscribe separately to the cable company's affiliated ISP. Cable
operators have generally exercised this privilege
and have refused to allow competing ISPs to ac24
cess their cable networks at any price.
This difference would not seem important if
Cable Companies Staking Claim In ISP Race, (visited Nov. 9,
1999) <www.statmarket.com/>; Broadband Media Compare
Well, (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <www.nua.ie/surveys/> (predicting that by 2002 more than one-quarter of American households will use broadband, and 80 percent of these households will use cable rather than DSL). Other technologies,
such as internet access via wireless, via satellite provider, or

via electric power lines, are still several years away from widespread deployment. See generally In re Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Report and
Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398 (1999) [hereinafter Advanced Services
Report] (describing state of broadband deployment). Furthermore, as discussed in Part II.C. infra, the arguments in this
article in favor of mandating open access to the cable apply
equally to these delivery systems as well. As explained below,
the First Amendment arguments presented herein apply to
all means of internet access, and the presence of competing
monopoly access providers does not relieve the need for
open access.
23 Cable system operators must provide access to their
networks for those wishing to provide competing video programming under the "leased access" provisions of the 1992
Cable Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1994). Other provisions of the
Act allow a local franchising authority ("LFA") to demand a
set-aside of channels for public, educational and government
programming ("PEG channels"). See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1994).
24
In response to the inability to negotiate a price for access, at least one ISP-Internet Ventures, Inc. (RV)-has at-
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broadband were simply a faster version of narrowband. The difference in speed is not merely one
of convenience, however, but of functionality.
Services such as movie-quality video or digital telephony simply cannot take place at lower speeds.
In addition, web pages have grown increasingly
complex and rich in information, a trend likely to
continue. As web pages become "fatter," they require more bandwidth to download and take
more time to pass through the last mile bottleneck. Over time, narrowband service will become
less useful; more of the internet will become accessible only through broadband connections.
B.

The AT&T Case

In 1998, AT&T purchased Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI"), the largest multiple system
owner ("MSO") in the United States.2

5

AT&T an-

nounced that it would use TCI's cable plant to offer broadband internet access and local telephony
service in competition with incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs").*21 AT&T assumed an

exclusive arrangement with TCI's affiliate broadband ISP, @Home Corporation, that terminates
tempted to use the leased access provisions of the Cable Act
to secure a channel for broadband internet access. See In re
Petition of Internet Ventures, Inc., Dkt. No. CSR-5407-L, at 4
(Aug. 11, 1999). The Commission denied this petition on
February 18, 2000. See generally In re Petition of Internet Ventures, Inc., Dkt. No. CSR-5407-L, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, FCC 00-37 (Feb. 18, 2000) [hereinafter IV! Order]. The
Commission relied on the fact that § 532 explicitly sets aside
commercial leased access channels for "video programming."
See 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(5) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997); see also IVI
Order, supra, at para. 12. The Commission explicitly refused
to determine whether internet services provided over cable
generally constitute "cable services" or "telecommunications*
services." IVI Order, supra, at para. 11.
25
See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of
Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from
Tele-Communications, Inc. to AT&T Corp., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 3160 (1999) [hereinafter
AT&T/TCI Merger Order]; In re Annual Assessment of the Sta-

tus of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 FCC Rcd. 24284, 24374,
para. 154 (1998) [hereinafter Fifth Annual Report].

26

See AT&T/TC/ MergerOrder, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3166, para.

27

See How Do AT&T, Excite@Home, Fit Together, SAN JOSE
Aug. 11, 1999, at A].

9.
MERCURY NEWS,

28 This application is pending before the FCC. See AT&T
Corp. and MediaOne Group Inc. Seek FCC Consent for a
Proposed Transfer of Control, Public Notice, 14 FCC Rcd.
11867 (1999). AT&T must also secure permission fiom the
Department of Justice Antitrust division before completing
this acquisition. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (outlawing
combinations in restraint of trade). See also generally 15 U.S.C.

in 2002.27 Following its acquisition of TCI, AT&T
announced plans to also acquire the cable MSO
MediaOne.2 8 Assuming AT&T is permitted to acquire MediaOne, AT&T will directly or indirectly
control approximately sixty percent of the na29
tion's cable networks.
Alarmed at the potential monopoly in deployment of broadband services, consumer groups,
competing ILECs and large internet service providers such as America Online ("AOL") vigorously
pressed the FCC to adopt an "open access" requirement either as a general regulation or as a
condition of permitting AT&T to acquire TCI and
MediaOne. 11 In an "open access" regime, cable
networks must allow competing ISPs to access
their networks at non-discriminatory prices."'
However, the FCC has repeatedly refused to im32
pose such a condition
Every cable system operates under a local
franchise;3 3 every TCI or MediaOne system acquired by AT&T must transfer its local franchise
to AT&T. This transfer process allows each local
franchise authority ("LFA") to scrutinize the
transaction and impose open access conditions.
Taking advantage of this structure, consumer
§ 2 (1994) (outlawing monopolization or attempts to monopolize); 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994) (establishing procedures for
premerger notification of the Assistant Attorney General and
the Federal Trade Commission for certain transfers).
29

See

DEBORAi

L. MORRIS, CABLE TELEVISION LAw

1999

UPDATE: COMPETITION IN VIDEO, INTERNET AND TELEPHONY, IN
PATENTS, COPYRIc.HTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LIrERARY PROPERTnY

578, 147 (Practicing Law Institute,
Oct. 1999) (stating that "contrary to its assertions, AT&T
would gain ownership interests in cable plant infrastructure
allowing it to pass more than 56 million homes, or 59 percent
of all cable homes passed in the country"). See generally Constiner Federation of America, Consumers Demand Open Access
to the High Speed Internet (visited Feb. 20, 2000)
<www.cOnsImerfed.org/internetaccess>
"I AT&T/TCI Merger Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3197, para.
75; Advanced Services Report, 14 FCC Rcd. at 2449, para. 101.
"I See No GateKeepers FAQ (visited Jan. 15, 2000)
<www.nogatekeepers.org/learnmore/faq.shtml>. Attempts to
define "nondiscriminatory" have usually led to requirements
that competitors receive the same or better terms as affiliated
ISPs. See, e.g., City of Portland Ordinance 1729555 (1998).
3'2 AT&T/TCI Meiger Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3207, para.
96; Advanced Set-vices Repoart, 14 FCC Rcd. at 2449, para. 101.
The FCC has rejected both the invitation to.impose such a
condition and AT&T's argument that the Commission lacks
the authority to impose such a condition. Rather, the Commission has maintained an attitude of "watchful waiting," declining to regulate the market but watching closely for signs
of developing monopoly. See generally Esbin, supra note 12;
Advanced Service Report, 14 FCC Rcd. at 2449; BROADBAND ToCOURSE HANDBOOK SERIES

DAY,

:

supra note 13.
47 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
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groups and other open access proponents have
petitioned the LFAs to impose open access requirements as a condition of transferring a
franchise. 3 4 Several municipalities, led by Portland, Oregon, have responded favorably to these
35
arguments.
The LFA in Portland required AT&T to provide
open access to its cable system to competing ISPs
on comparable terms to those offered AT&T's affiliate @Home, as a condition of local service. 3 6 In
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, AT&T appealed
this ordinance to the U.S. district court in Oregon
but lost at that level. 37 AT&T has appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
II.

AT&T'S FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT

AT&T has pressed two species of First Amendment argument with increasing vigor. 38 First,
AT&T claims a First Amendment right to provide
the @Home service exclusively, either as speech
39
or as a protected exercise of editorial discretion.
Second, AT&T claims that the requirement to
40
provide access constitutes "compelled speech."
Before discussing these claims, however, it is important to understand the relationship between
34
See, e.g., No Gatekeepers (visited Feb. 20, 2000)
<www.nogatekeepers.org/about> (listing groups who support
open access).
35
At the time of this article, LFAs that have required
open access as a condition of offering internet access service
include Broward County, Florida; Fairfax City, Virginia; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and North Andover, Massachusetts.
Several other LFAs have included "Portland clauses," clauses
that allow them to reexamine the issue of open access if Portland's open access provision is upheld in court. See Mary Ann
Barton, AT&T Decision to Open Cable Internet to ISP Doesn't Impress County Officials, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
(visited Jan. 18, 2000) <www.naco.org/pubs/cnews/current/
at&t.htm>; Patricia Fusco, Gang of Four Takes on AT&TMediaOne in Massachusetts, INTERNETNEWS.COM (visited Jan.
18, 2000) <www.internetnews.com>; Patricia Fusco, Open Access Debate Comes to Virginia, INTERNETNEWS.COM (visited Jan.
18, 2000) <www.internetnews.com>; FCC to Fight Open Cable
Access, WIRED NEws, Jul. 21, 1999 <www.wired.com>.
36 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146,
1150 (D. Or. 1999).
37 See id. at 1156. The appeal has been docketed at No.
99-35609 (9th Cir. 1999).
38
Although AT&T's briefs focused primarily on the preemption issue, AT&T attempted to cast this in a First Amendment light in its oral argument before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. See generally Brief of Appellant, City of Portland, No. 99-35609 (11th Cir. Aug. 9, 1999) available at
<www.techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/19990809.htm>,
[hereinafter AT&T Brief]. A video record of the oral argument may be found at <media.ci.portland.or.us:2259/

AT&T and @Home and the underlying technology.
A.

The AT&T/@Home Relationship

AT&T and @Home have consistently represented themselves as separate entities, although
AT&T now owns a controlling interest in @Home.
As a legal matter, however, AT&T and @Home
maintain independent existences and contract
with each other for services. As explained by the
parties, @Home provides two services to cable clients such as AT&T: 4 1 internet infrastructure,
which allows access through standard internet
protocols and additional proprietary content. In
exchange, AT&T and other cable partners/clients
provide @Home exclusive access to their cable
subscribers, install any necessary customer premise equipment, and bill the customer as part of
42
the customer's monthly cable bill.

To clarify this, one must recall that "the internet" is not a single entity or network. Rather,
the internet is a "network of networks" that communicate through the use of common protocols. 43 ISPs provide access to the internet for subscribers through proprietary networks. 44 Thus, a
ramgen/pdxvsattv.rm>. AT&T has also pressed this argument
before the FCC as grounds for rejecting an open access requirement. See Reply Comments of AT&T Corp. and MediaOnein
CS Dkt. No. 99-251, at 121-22 (Sept. 17, 1999).
39
See AT&T Brief, supranote 38, at 19. See also, e.g., Reply
Comments of AT&T Corp. and MediaOne, supra note 38.
40
AT&T also claims that conditioning open access on
providing

internet

service

"punishes"

it for providing

@Home's speech, in violation of the First Amendment.
Courts have routinely rejected such claims, finding that a
condition based on offering a service is content-neutral. See,
e.g., Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151,
182-84 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
41
@Home notes in its brief that it provides these services
for other cable companies that choose to use @Home as a
means of providing internet access to subscribers. Brief of
@Home, at 8, City of Portland,No. 99-35609 (11 Cir. Aug. 16,
1999), available at <www.techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/19990816exc.htm> [hereinafter @Home Brief]. AT&T
and @Home have an exclusive contract only in that AT&T
agrees to use @Home to the exclusion of other ISPs. Id. at
4-5 (describing exclusive distribution arrangements with
cable operator/clients). See Barton, supra note 35. This exclusivity will last until 2002, and AT&T has indicated that it may
contemplate opening its network when its existing contract
with @Home ends. See id.
42
@Home Brief, supra note 41, at 4-5.
43 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa.
1996). For a general description of the internet and its operations, see DIGITAL ToRNADo, supra note 12, at 10-22. 44 See DIGITAL ToRNADo, supra note 12, at 12.
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user subscribing to @Home does not directly access the internet. Rather, the user enters
@Home's own proprietary system, described by
@Home as a "parallel internet." 45 The user does
so through a cable line provided by AT&T, which
connects with the @Home national network,
which in turn connects the end-user to both
@Home's proprietary content and to the public
46
internet at large.
As described in more detail in Part II infra, requiring the subscriber to pass through @Home's
proprietary system allows @Home to control how
subscribers download or upload information from
the internet ("surfing the 'net," in the argot of
cyberspace). Requiring the subscriber to use the
@Home system also gives @Home the ability to
favor its own proprietary content and discriminate
against content it disfavors.
B.

The Effect on AT&T's First Amendment
Claims

As, a result of the relationship with @Home,
AT&T's First Amendment claim must actually be
broken into two parts: AT&T's claims (1) that a
requirement to open its wire network to others violates its First Amendment Rights and (2) that it
has a First Amendment right to provide the
@Home service and @Home proprietary content.

47

However, this bifurcation creates significant difficulties for AT&T's First Amendment claim.
When AT&T merely provides passive transport of
another's content, where is the expressive conduct that gives rise to a First Amendment claim?
Recognizing this weakness, AT&T has at45
See @Home Brief, supra note 41, at 8; see also DIGITAL
ToRNADo, supra note 12, at 12.
46
See @Home Brief, supra note 41, at 10-13; DIGITAL
ToRNADo, supra note 12, at 12.
47
This First Amendment calculus does not change even
where AT&T or another cable MSO is itself the speaker. As
explained infra in Part III, in the absence of scarcity of channels, nothing prevents the MSO from "speaking" under an
open access regime and accordingly, no First Amendment
right is implicated. Similarly, the argument in Part IV infra,
that a compelling state purpose exists that would justify open
access even under intermediate First Amendment scrutiny
applies with equal force with an MSO is the speaker or
whether the MSO is a passive conduit.
48
Precisely how the open access mandate is punitive is
unclear from AT&T's pleadings, since AT&T is not being
asked to subsidize the access from other ISPs, and may
charge any non-discriminatory market rate. See City of Portland, 43 F.Supp.2d at 1150. Arguably, it is punitive because it

tempted to cast its decision to carry @Home-to
the exclusion of others-as a First Amendment issue. As an initial matter, AT&T argues that its de-

cision to carry one service that provides proprietary content to the exclusion of all others is an
exercise of editorial discretion protected by the
First Amendment.
AT&T has also attempted to characterize the

open access requirement as a "penalty" on protected speech and therefore, prohibited under
the First Amendment. AT&T appears to reason as
follows: The decision to carry @Home and pro-

vide internet access triggers the "open access"
provision, and "open access" is punitive. 48 The decision to carry @Home exclusively is an editorial
decision by AT&T, protected under the First
Amendment in the same way that it's right to

carry a traditional cable channel is protected
under the First Amendment. Because the decision
to carry @Home is expressive, the argument proceeds, penalizing AT&T for deciding to carry
@Home by forcing it to open its network to
others, punishes AT&T for expressive conduct in
49
violation of the First Amendment.

Despite AT&T's attempt to characterize these
arguments as separate, they are in fact flip sides of
the same coin: Does AT&T have an editorial right

protected by the First Amendment to choose an
exclusive internet service provider and require
subscribers to access the public internet through
its closed network?
In support of its First Amendment claim, AT&T
has primarily relied on three cases: Miami Herald
Publishing Company v. Tornillo,50 Turner Broadcast-

ing System, Inc. v. FCC ("Turner

J1)51

and Turner

BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC ("Turner //").52 As
will deprive AT&T of the income it would otherwise obtain
from exclusive use of @Home. Courts, however, have consistently rejected such arguments. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman
Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-72 (1997); Time
Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 182-84 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); see generally Amsat Cable, Ltd. v. Cablevision of
Connecticut, Ltd., 6 F.3d 867, 871 (2nd Cir. 1993).
49
Alternatively, AT&T at times seems to suggest that the
open access provisions penalize it for offering @Home's content. AT&T Brief, supra note at 56-58. This assertion has no
basis in fact, since none of the open access requirements proposed are conditioned on the nature of @Home's content.
See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F.Supp. 2d at 1153.
50
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
51
52

512 U.S. 622 (1994).
520 U.S. 180 (1997). To some extent, AT&T also relies

on Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno, the Court
held that speech over the internet deserved unqualified First
Amendment protection. See id. at 870. As explained below,
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discussed below, however, Tornillo is not relevant
to AT&T's claim. Furthermore, while the Turner
cases are relevant, AT&T has failed to allege sufficient facts in any of its pleadings before the courts
or the FCC to sustain a First Amendment objection to open access.
III.

THE PROBLEM WITH AT&T'S FIRST
AMENDMENT CLAIM: THE MEDIUM IS
NOT THE MESSAGE

AT&T's reliance on the Tornillo case blurs the
medium and the message. In Tornillo, the Miami
Herald ran an editorial attacking Pat Tornillo, a
candidate for local office. 53 Tornillo demanded
an opportunity to respond to the editorial, invoking a Florida law guaranteeing a "right of reply"
for political candidates. 54 The newspaper refused
to print the reply, arguing that doing so would violate its First Amendment right to publish its
opinions. 55
The Tornillo court agreed that the right of reply
violated the newspaper's First Amendment rights.
In doing so, the court relied on two factors: First,
the Florida statute was content based; it exacted a
"penalty" (in the form of compelled speech)
5 6
based solely on the contents of the editorial.
Although the financial consequences of publishing a second editorial may be slight, the Court expressed concern that "editors might well conclude
that the safe course is to avoid controversy." 57 Accordingly, the penalty would have a chilling effect
on the First Amendment expression of newspapers.
This argument seems inapplicable to AT&T's
offering the @Home service. It is not the content of
@Home that triggers the open access requirement. Rather, the requirement comes into play as
a function of offering the internet access service.
this does not help AT&T. Reno does not extend blanket First
Amendment protection to internet access providers, any
more than Tornillo extends First Amendment protection to
all acts of newspaper vendors. Reno protects content disseminated over the internet, not the mechanism by which it is
disseminated.
53
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243.
54 See id. at 244.
55

See id.

56

See id. at 256-57.

57

Id. at 257.

See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. at 645-52; Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1991) (service tax on provision of cable services content neutral, despite state distinction between cable television and satellite providers).
58

Courts have consistently found such requirements
content-neutral, not content-based. 58
More significantly, however, the Tornillo Court
found that the statute intruded impermissibly into
"the function of editors" and thus amounted to an
interference with the newspaper's free expression. As the Court explained,
A newspaper is more than a passive . . . conduit for
news, comment and advertising. The choice of material
to go into a newspaper, and decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair

or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how gov-

ernmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees
of
59
a free press as they have evolved to this time.

The difficulty for AT&T in this analysis is that it
is quite literally a "passive conduit" for the
@Home service. As described by both AT&T and
@Home, AT&T simply provides a connection
through its cable wire to the subscriber. The proprietary content and internet access is furnished
by @Home.
Both scholars and the courts have recognized
that the level of First Amendment protection due
to a cable system depends upon the nature of its
conduct, i.e., whether its conduct is expressive
(designed to communicate a particular message
to the subscriber) or whether the cable system
simply acts as a conduit for the speech of others. 60
As one author recognized well before the issue of
internet access ever arose, "The key to cable's
First Amendment regime lies in distinguishing, as
reasonably as possible, among the expressive and
nonexpressive activities of operators. That regime
should provide First Amendment protection
when content-related expressive activities are involved, and pull back that protection when such
activities are not."61
59

Id. at 258.

60 See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. at 645; City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)

(Blackmun, J. concurring); Warner Cable Communications,
Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 637 (lth Cir. 1990);
Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression,
1988 DuKE L.J. 329, 331 (1988); see also Jerry Berman &
Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control. Renewing the

Democratic Heart of the FirstAmendment in the Age of Interactive
Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619 (1995) (arguing that First Amendment protection for any medium should be based on architecture of the medium and the degree to which it encourages
diversity of information and user control).

61

Brenner, supra note 60, at 331.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

Thus, to the extent AT&T and other cable
MSOs merely provide a passive conduit for
@Home's content, they cannot claim a First
Amendment right under Tornillo to resist an open
access requirement.
The Exercise of Editorial Discretion

A.

However, AT&T's status as a conduit does not
end the matter. Although the Supreme Court
found that the generally passive nature of cable
operation does not deserve the same level of First
Amendment protection awarded to newspapers or
other creators of content, it has recognized that
cable operators do exercise a First Amendment
right in selecting what content to place upon
62
their cable systems.
The seminal cases on the question on the degree of deference owed to a cable operator's selection of channels are Turner I and I. In 1992,
Congress imposed a requirement on cable system
operators that they carry local broadcast stations. 63 In considering under what standard to

evaluate Congress' must-carry requirements, the
Supreme Court considered the nature of the First
Amendment protection awarded cable as compared to other media. The Court rejected the argument that cable operators exercised sufficient
control to warrant full First Amendment protec64
tion of the sort provided newspapers in Tornillo,
but the court also rejected the lesser degree of
65
protection from intrusion given broadcasters.
Instead, the Court determined that a cable operator's editorial activities are sufficiently expressive
66
to warrant an intermediate level of scrutiny.
Under this standard, a content-neutral government regulation that intrudes on a cable operator's editorial discretion must be justified by a
"substantial" government interest and must not
"burden substantially more speech than is neces67
sary" to further those interests.

At first glance, it would appear that AT&T's de62
See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636; Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444;
Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494-95.

63

Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-

tion Act of 1992 § 4, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35) [hereinafter 1992 Cable
Act].
64
65
66
67

Turner I, 512 U.S. at 655.
See id. at 641.

68

Even if Turner applies, this does not end the inquiry.

See id. at 645.
See id. at 661.
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cision to carry @Home exclusively should receive
the same level of intermediate scrutiny. Such a result, however, is not mandated by the Turner decisions. Indeed, the underlying rational of the Turner decisions suggests otherwise. 6 The court
based its decision to apply intermediate scrutiny
on the following premise:
There can be no disagreement on an initial
premise: Cable programmers and cable operators
engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment. Through original
programming or by exercising editorial discretion
over which stations or programs to include in its
repertoire, cable programmers and operators
seek to communicate messages on a wide variety
of topics and in a wide variety of formats. By requiring cable systems to set aside a portion of
their channels for local broadcasters, the must
carry rules regulate cable speech in two respects:
the rules reduce the number of channels over
which cable operators exercise unfettered control, and they render it more difficult for cable
programmers to compete for carriage on the lim69
ited channels remaining
This premise does not apply with equal force
when a cable MSO such as AT&T offers an internet access service such as @Home. As an initial
matter, although some courts have interpreted
Turner I as requiring intermediate scrutiny in all
70
cases involving the provision of cable service,
the TurnerCourt clearly limited its decision to the
must-carry rules at issue. As the Court noted, the
must-carry rules acted to constrain a cable operator's choice of programming, since the scarcity of
channels required the cable operator to forgo
channels it wished to provide programming. 7' By
contrast, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that rules of general applicability that do not restrict an operator's editorial choice are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.7 2 Indeed, even
the print media do not enjoy freedom from laws
As explained below, the open access requirements survive in-

termediate scrutiny as a content neutral means of achieving a
substantial government interest, while imposing no greater
burden on speech than necessary. See generally Turner I, 512

U.S. at 636
69

70

at 636-37.
See, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment v F.C.C., 56 F.3d
Id.

151, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
71 See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636-37.
72
See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447-48.
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of general applicability, even where such laws im73
pact on editorial discretion.

It is unclear that providing consumers with a
choice of ISP deprives a cable system operator of
any channels. Because the Portland case was decided on summary judgment, no evidentiary record exists upon which to make a determination in
the AT&T case. Significantly, however, in its filings before the federal courts and before the
FCC, AT&T has never invoked this scarcity
claim.7 4 Assuming no scarcity problem, nothing
prevents an MSO from offering its full complement of services and providing consumers with a
choice of ISP. The question thus becomes does an
MSO's right to editorial expression-as identified
in Turner-include a right to force users to go
through a service such as @Home before reaching
the brdader internet?
In the AT&T case, AT&T and @Home have repeatedly represented that an @Home subscriber
can access the entire content of the internet and
can even set his or her browser to open to another website. 75 Thus, although the default for

@Home subscribers is the "parallel internet" of
the @Home system, the "real" internet is simply a
"click" away. To assert a First Amendment right in
the absence of scarcity under these circumstances,
AT&T would be asserting a First Amendment
right to have the user default be the @Home pro76
prietary system and content.

Such a claim seems farfetched indeed. It is a
73

See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20

(1944).
74 On June 14, 1999, GTE-a vocal proponent of open
access-announced that it had performed tests demonstrating that one could provide subscribers a choice of ISP without depriving the cable operator of any channels. See Patricia
Fusco, G7 Debunks Cable Access Myth, INTERNET NEWS (visited
Feb. 11, 2000) <www.internetnews.com/isp-news/print/
0,1089,8_137621,00.html>; GTE Demonstrates Ease Of Cable
Open Access to Multiple ISPs; ClearwaterTrial Shows One-Time Investment of Less Than $1 Per Home Would Provide Consumer
Choice (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <www.gte.com/AboutGTE/
NewsCenter/News/Releases/ClearwaterOpenAccess.html>.
Although AT&T criticized the study and questioned its validity, it produced no evidence to the contrary. See Opposition
Brief of U.S.West, Interprise America, Inc., GTE Internetworking, Inc., and OGC Telecomm, Ltd., at n.35, City
of Portland, No.
99-35609,
available at
<www.techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/
19990907gte.htm>.
75 See City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1154; see also
AT&T/TCI Merger, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3206-07.
76
This takes AT&T at its word that it will not discriminate. As discussed below, AT&T also has incentive to force

truism that while the First Amendment guarantees everyone a right to speak-and in a way that
make it reasonable for a willing audience to
hear-the First Amendment does not compel an
unwilling audience to listen. 7 7 Thus, while AT&T
certainly has an economic interest in requiring
such a default and excluding other providers,
such an economic interest alone does not support
78
a First Amendment objection.

This leaves only one possible First Amendment
"editorial" reason for offering a service such as
@Home exclusively: it gives the provider the ability to control how subscribers access the internet.
Does AT&T have a right to discriminate against
unaffiliated content-a right AT&T claims it will
never exercise but apparently wishes to preserve.
Courts have never recognized a right to block
access to the speech of others. To the contrary,
they have consistently resisted a claim to any such
right as antithetical to the First Amendment. 79 As
the Supreme Court observed, "The right of free.
speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck,
or any other individual does not embrace a right
to snuff out the free speech of others."80
B.

The Compelled Speech Claim

The First Amendment recognizes not only a
right to speak, but a right to keep silent. A law
may not require an entity to engage in actual or
symbolic speech,8 1 to endorse or finance speech
subscribers to use the @Home system because this gives
AT&T the ability to discriminate in favor of its proprietary

content or in favor of partners' or affiliates' content.
77
See Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v. City of
Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1990).
78

See Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc., 521

U.S. 457 (1997); Amsat Cable, Ltd. v. Cablevision of Connecticut, Ltd., 6 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1993).
79
See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 387 (1969); Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v.
City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638-40 (11th Cir. 1990). Accord City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.,
476 U.S. 488 (1986) (grant of exclusive cable franchise may
violate First Amendment of would-be cable providers). See
also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 847 (state may not create

"hecklers veto" that would silence others); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel law may not be
used to silence the press); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 144-45
and supra note 22 (government obligation to use reasonable

crowd control measures to prevent hostile audience from silencing speaker).
80 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387.
81 See Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of N.C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988).
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political or ideological speech

2

or to associate

83

with ideas it finds distasteful. AT&T raises the
claim that carrying the speech of other ISPs constitutes "compelled speech" and therefore violates
8 4
the First Amendment.
Any such claim must be analyzed under the
Supreme Court's most recent statement on compelled speech, Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.8 5 Glickman addressed the authority of U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture to enforce an assessment
against California nectarine growers for generic
advertising of California fruit.8 6 Some nectarine
growers objected, arguing that they could spend
the money more profitably on individual advertising and that generic advertising benefited their
business rivals.17 The court rejected the growers'
First Amendment claims.""
The Court found three factors determinative.8 9
First, the assessment for generic advertising and
the general regulatory scheme did not impose any
restraint on the plaintiffs' abilities to communicate their own message. t 1 The growers remained
free to engage in whatever individualized or
targeted advertising they wished.9 1 The assessment's reduction of the growers' individual advertising budgets did not constitute any sort of impediment or penalty on transmitting their
individual messages.9 2 Second, the scheme did
not compel any grower to engage in actual or symbolic speech or appear to endorse such speech;
the generic advertising was created and attributed
to the broader organization of California fruit
93
growers.
Finally, the statutory scheme did not require
the plaintiffs to finance any political or ideological views or abhorrent messages.9 4 The sole
message of the generic advertising was "buy California fruit," a message to which the growers
could not possibly object.9 5 Although growers
might prefer individual advertising to generic ad82
See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1997).

83

See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual

Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
84
85

See id.
521 U.S. 457 (1997).

86

See id. at 460-61.

87

See id. at 463, 467-88.

88

See id. at 469.

89

See id.

90

See id.

91

See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469.
See id. at 470.
See id. at 470-71.

92

93
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vertising or might resent the fact that generic advertising helped rival fruit growers as well as themselves, these objections did not raise a First
Amendment issue. The assessment therefore constituted a straightforward economic regulation,
requiring only a rational basis to support its constitutionality.9 6
The same analysis applies to open access in the
absence of channel scarcity. To return to the
AT&T case, the open access regime does not prevent AT&T from providing to any willing subscriber AT&T's own repertoire of cable services
and products. Nor does'open access compel
AT&T to engage in any speech; it merely requires
AT&T to make its cable plant available so that a
subscriber to its cable service may affirmatively
seek the services of a different ISP.
Finally, because AT&T has stated that a subscription to @Home provides a subscriber with access to the entire content of the internet, AT&T
cannot claim that its is "endors[ing] or
financ[ing] any political or ideological view" or
any message it finds objectionable. As the district
court found in the Portland case, AT&T cannot
claim a right of editorial discretion because subscribers will not hold it accountable for objection9
able content found on the internet.

7

It is also worth noting that courts have found
other "open access" provisions applied to cable
constitutional, even where a greater possibility exists that a cable subscriber will mistakenly ascribe
the views of the outside speaker to the cable operator. For example, cable operators must provide
access to their cable systems to local broadcast signals

("must-carry"),98

outside unaffiliated pro-

gramming ("leased access") 9 or public, educational and government programming ("PEG
channels")," 10 and must provide these services as
part of their regular programming package indistinguishable from its own program offerings. By
See id. at 469.
See id. at 472.
96 See id. at 470.
97
See City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
98 See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (1994) (noting that "[m]ust-carry
involves the requirement that cable systems carry local broadcast stations")
99 See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1994) (stating that cable operators must set aside a specific number of channels for leased
access by private individuals).
l00 See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1994) (stating that an LFA may
require a cable operator to set aside channels for public, educational or government ("PEG") use).
94

95
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contrast, the subscriber wishing to use an ISP
other than the one provided by the cable operator must affirmatively select the ISP. Furthermore,
the interactive nature of the internet and the
need for the internet user to affirmatively seek
out content' 0 ' make it unreasonable to assume
that a subscriber using an ISP other than @Home
will hold AT&T responsible for any content encountered.
C.

ices. Io" Clearly Congress, in authorizing cable sys-

Does Turner Apply if Broadband is a
Telecommunication Service Rather Than a
Cable Service?

Even if Turnerenvisions a right to force users to
view proprietary content when a cable service operates as a cable service, this does not settle the
matter. As the panel for the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted during oral argument in the
Portland case, it is unclear how to characterize internet access through cable systems of the sort
provided by AT&T and @Home. 1 2 Both Portland
and AT&T agreed to treat the service as a cable
service, but the FCC in its amicus brief questioned
this assessment. The FCC explained that internet
over cable may in fact be a telecommunications
service rather than a cable service. During oral argument, the panel indicated that they would not
accept the parties' stipulation as to the nature of
the service and would instead determine the matter for itself.
Turner cannot be fairly read to mean that every
action performed by a cable company is shielded
by the First Amendment. Rather, it seems more
reasonable to read Turner as applying only to
traditional cable functions, where cable operators
exercise editorial control. However, where a cable
service acts as a common carrier and provides a
telecommunication service, it should be treated as
101
102

of

See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852.
See Amicus Curiae Brief of the FCC, at 9-11 of 13, City

Portland, No.

99-35609,

available

a common carrier and subject to open access requirements.
Such an interpretation is consistent with Congress's analysis. As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress stated that cable companies providing telecommunications services
must secure a franchise from the appropriate
franchising authority and that the provisions of
the Communications Act applicable to cable services do not apply to telecommunications serv-

at

<www.techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/
19990816fcc.htm>. But see Esbin, supra note 12, at 41 (concluding that cable broadband service is probably a cable service).
103
47 U.S.C. § 541(b) (3) (1994 & Stipp. III 1997).
104
This distinction makes perfect sense. Congress has
declared telephony a basic service and mandated universal
service of basic telephony to all Americans. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 254 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). No similar provision exists for
cable, which, while serving an important role in the dissemination of information, is simply not regarded in the same

way. Arguably, Congress may regard advanced telecommuni-

tem operators to provide telecommunications
services, intended to encourage cable services to
enter the retail telecommunications market and
compete with incumbent local exchange telephony providers for residential customers. At the
same time, however, section 541 (b) (3) of the Act
demonstrates that Congress did not wish to insulate cable companies providing telecommunications services from state regulation in the same
way that it insulated cable companies in the provi0
sion of their cable services.1

4

Such an interpretation is also consistent with
the general principles of telecommunications law.
Traditionally, although speakers using a telecommunication system have a First Amendment
right, 1° 5 this right is distinguishable from the

rights of the network provider, who merely provides a passive conduit for speech. 00 Indeed, for
the last 30 years, open access has been the rule for
internet access provided via telecommunications
services.' 0 7 Under the Commission's various Computer proceedings, the telephone networks have
provided open access to any ISP wishing to provide internet service, even where the telephone
company offers rival services it might wish to offer
without competition."' These provisions have
withstood judicial scrutiny and First Amendment

cations services, of which cable broadband is a subset, as a
basic and essential service in the same way it regards voice
telephony as an essential service. See Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Title VII, § 706, Pub. L. No. 104-104 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 157 (1994 & Stipp. 11 1997)) (requiring the FCC
and the states to use regulatory forbearance to foster deployment of advanced telecommunications services to "all Americans").
105
See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989).
"o6 See Brenner, supra note 60, at 329-30.
107
See Esbin, supra note 12, at 71; UNREGULATION OF THE
INTERNET, supra note 12, at 15-16.
108

See

ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS

§10.5 (West 1999)

LAW

[Vol. 8

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

challenges.10 1As discussed in more detail below,
rather than violating the First Amendment, the
open access requirements have furthered the aims
of the First Amendment by creating the most robust "marketplace of ideas" known to mankind.' 10
Applying Turner intermediate scrutiny if internet over cable is a telecommunications service
would raise serious questions regarding the validity of the comprehensive regulation of common
carriers, including separation of businesses lines,
the prohibition on long-distance competition by
the regional Bell operating companies ("RBOCs")
and access to unbundled network elements
("UNEs") by competitors. Given the well-settled
law in this area of telecommunications that such
regulation does not raise First Amendment issues,
it seems unlikely that the Portland Court would
disturb this analysis simply because AT&T is offering a telecommunication service bundled with a
cable service, using the same mode of transport as
it does for its cable service.
To conclude, it is unclear whether the intermediate scrutiny standard of Turner applies. As an initial matter, the scarcity of channels the Court
considered significant in Turner may not exist in
connection with the provision of internet services
and open access. If the only effect of open access
is to require AT&T to provide a service in addition
to the services and content already provided, this
would not seem to trigger a First Amendment issue under Turner. Portland would not interfere
with AT&T's editorial discretion in assembling a
package of content and service offerings. Furthermore, it is unclear that offering a passive service,
as distinct from the content usually offered, constitutes an expressive act protected by the First
Amendment. Even if a First Amendment concern
can be raised in the absence of scarcity, it should
be subjected to the "forced speech" analysis of
Glickman.
Furthermore, Turner simply should not apply if
the court finds internet over cable service to be a
telecommunications service rather than a cable
service. To find otherwise would be to reverse
more than 30 years of consistent application of
109

See, e.g., United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc.,

673 F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C. 1987).
110 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 879-83 (Dalzell, J.,
concurring).
Ill
112
1'

Turner II, 520 U.S. at 180.
City of Portland,43 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
See generally Turner II, 520 U.S. 180; Sunstein, supra

open access to telephone networks and to call
into question the entire scheme of common carrier regulation.
THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST: PROTECTING A CITIZEN'S
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

IV.

Even if Turner applies and the Portland Court
applies an intermediate level of scrutiny, this does
not end the matter. Under the Turner standard,
Portland's open access provision still stands if "it
advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does
not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.""' The City of
Portland chose to rest its ordinance on the need
to promote competition.1

12

On appeal, however,

both intervenor Oregon ISP Association
("ORISPA") and a coalition of consumer groups
filing as amici curiae ("consumer amici') pointed
to a much stronger interest: protecting the First
Amendment rights of Portland's citizens to speak
and to hear information from a diversity of
sources, a government interest of the highest or1 13

der.

As discussed below, Portland's open access ordinance protects its citizens' First Amendment right
in three different ways. First, simply preserving
competition among ISPs "ensur[es] public access
to a multiplicity of information sources."' 14 Second, cable operators have the technological potential to discriminate against providers of outside
information-for example, to discriminate
against content critical of the cable provider or of
a business partner or subsidiary-and favor their
own proprietary content. In addition, cable operators can and do restrict the ability of their subscribers to participate in the internet, setting limits on the amount of content subscribers can
upload or download from outside @Home's network. 15 Because the technology permits cable operators to discriminate in subtle ways virtually undetectable by the subscriber-such as slowing
down the speed a subscriber downloads informanote 8.
114

Turner II, 520 U.S. at 190 (citing Turner 1, 512 U.S. at

663).
115

See Brock N. Meeks, Excite@Home Keeps a 'Video Collar,'

ZDNET, Nov. 1, 1999 <www.zdnet.corn>. See also Werbach,
supra note 10, at 5-6.
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tion while enhancing the speed with which a subscriber accesses @Home's content-the only way
for Portland to protect its citizens is to provide a
choice among access providers using the broad-

fair competition... , even when the individuals or
entities subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive activity protected by the First

band network. 116

Rather than holding application of fair competition laws an unconstitutional burden on speakers under the First Amendment, courts have long
recognized that promoting competition in the
communications area is crucial to preserving the
First Amendment. As the Supreme Court stated
over half a century ago:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the
grave concern for freedom of the press which
prompted adoption of the First Amendment
should be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom

Finally, as others have noted, cable will set the
standard for the next development in broadband
architecture.' 17 Even if the FCC is correct in concluding that existing broadband access through
DSL and emerging competition from new technologies will act to discipline cable, this will not
help if the architecture favors a closed model tying access to content." s At the moment, the internet is the most interactive medium for the dissemination of information ever known precisely
because internet users can immediately access all
parts equally.' 19 Without an open access requirement built into broadband networks-beginning
with cable-the internet may well lose this inter20
active quality.'
A.

Competition

21

As an initial matter, an entity engaging in First
Amendment activities is not shielded from fair
competition laws. As the Supreme Court stated in
Turner II:
We have identified a corresponding 'governmental purpose of the highest order' in ensuring
public access to 'a multiplicity of information
sources[.]' And it is undisputed that the Government has an interest in 'eliminating restraints on
116

See Werbach, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining cable op-

erators' control by stating, "Any ISP faces pressure to keep
customers in its own orbit, but users can normally vote with
their feet").
117
See id. at 10.
118
119

See id.

120

Compare Werbach, supra note 10, at 5-6, with UN-

See UNREGULATION

OF THE INTERNET,

supra note 12, at

5.
supra note 12, at 5.
Although this section focuses on competition in the
ISP market, it should be noted that open access provides the
PECULATION OF THE INTERNET,
121

valuable function of providing competition in the provision
of cable video programming services as well. Through
streaming media and other technologies, internet providers
can compete directly with the cable MSOs in their primary

market-not merely in the market for internet services. See,
e.g., Mark Wigfield, Cyberlaw Expert Lessig Pushesfor Open Cable
Access, Dow JONES NEWSWIRE, Feb. 24, 2000, available at
<news.excite.com:80/news/dj/000224/20000224-001656>;
Larry Lessig, Cyberspace Prosecutor, The Standard, Feb. 21,
2000, available at <www.thestandard.com/article/display/
0,1151,10885,00.html>. See also David Lieberman, Media giants' Net change: Major companies establish strongfoothold online,

Amendment.

'

22

[The First] Amendment rests on the assump-

...

tion that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free
23
press is a condition of a free society.'
Furthermore, where some limitation renders
true competition impossible, courts have long recognized the need-if not the affirmative dutyfor government intervention to protect the public's First Amendment right to a diversity of information sources.' 24 "It is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial." 125 Courts have applied this logic not

merely to newspapers and broadcast media, but to
network operation as well. 126 Where an entity
USA

TODAY,

Dec. 14, 1999, at 3B (reporting that AT&T CEO

Daniel Somers intends to prohibit streaming video from
competing with AT&T's video offering, quoting him as saying: "AT&T didn't spend $56 billion to get into the cable
business to have the blood sucked out of our vein"). Indeed,
creating effective competition to cable programming was one
o the primary goals of the 1992 Cable Act, and on its own
would justify open access. See 1992 Cable Act § 2(a) (6), 47
U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (1994) ("substantial governmental and
First Amendment interest in promoting diversity of views
through multiple technology media"); id. at § 2(b) (1), 47
U.S.C. § 521 (b) (1) (the policy of the Act is to "promote the
availability to the public of views and information through

cable television and other video distribution media").
122

663).
123

Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 190 (citing Turner, 512 U.S. at

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20

(1945).
124
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 389-90 (1969).
125
Id. at 390.
126
See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131, 183-85 (1982), rev'd, 797 F.2d 1082, rev'd, 894
F.2d 430, and rev'd in part,.900 F.2d 283.
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both controls the network and creates proprietary
information, it "pose Es] a substantial threat to the
27
First Amendment diversity principle." 1
Congress exhibited the same concerns with respect to cable industry operations. In enacting the
1992 Cable Act, Congress recognized the danger
to free speech posed by any entity with monopoly
access to the home. The Senate and House Reports both noted the dangers posed to free
speech when any one entity develops monopoly
28
power over the flow of information to citizens. 1
As Congress recognized, federal policy has consistently resisted concentrations of market power
in the communications industry previously consid129
ered "safe" under traditional antitrust analysis.
As the Senate Report explained,
There are special concerns about concentration
of the media in the hands of a few who may control the dissemination of information. The concern is that the media gatekeepers will (1) slant
information according to their own biases, or (2)
provide no outlet for unorthodox or unpopular
speech because it does not sell well, or both. 10
Furthermore, Congress noted the ability and incentive of monopoly media gatekeepers to leverage their monopoly power to favor their own proprietary content over that of others.131 To counter
this danger, "the Government can and should
132
take reasonable steps to promote diversity."'
However, because direct regulation of content for
this purpose would violate the First Amendment,
the government should fulfill its "affirmative role

Amendment discourse available through the in-

...to

The @Home system architecture, however, permits a subtler form of discrimination. On July 29,
1999, an alliance of consumer groups submitted a
letter to FCC Chairman William Kennard detailing how @Home may employ network management techniques to discriminate against outside
3 7
content and favor its own proprietary content.1

encourage a diversity of voices" by imposing

structural limitations on the industry that encourage competition. "
While this reasoning certainly holds true for
video programming offered via cable, it is especially accurate for internet services offered over
cable, given the greater interactivity and First
127
Western Electric Co., 673 F. Supp. at 586 (citing United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 184-85).
128
See S. REP. No. 102-92, at 32-34 (1992); H.R. REP. No.
102-628, at 42 (1992).
129
S. REP. No. 102-92, at 32, 50; H.R. REP. No. 102-628,

at 42.
1:-' S. REP. No. 102-92, at 32.
I'l'

S. REP. No. 102-92, at 33, 51; H.R. REP. No. 102-628,

at 42.
132

S. REP. No. 102-92, at 51 (citing Associated Press, 326

U.S. at 20); Federal Communications Comm'n v. National
Citizens Comm'n for Broad, 436 U.S. 775 (1977)).
13 See S. REP. No. 102-92, at 50.
134
35

See generally Berman & Weitzner, supra note 60.
It is worth noting in this context that in the early days

ternet as compared with traditional cable. 134 As

Congress observed in the context of basic cable
service, open access to the network advances the
First Amendment simply by promoting greater
competition among competing ISPs. Open access
and the ensuing competition neutralize the ability
of MSOs such as AT&T or services such as
@Home to act as "media gatekeepers" by preventing them from discriminating against disfavored
content or from directing users toward thier own
proprietary content. 135 Promotion of competition
therefore furthers the interests of the First
Amendment rather than hindering them, as
AT&T claims.
B.

The @Home Technology

In any situation, a party who has monopoly control of the network and also produces proprietary
content has incentive to discriminate in favor of
its own content. In conventional media, however,
users and regulators can observe gross discrimination fairly easily. For example, if a cable system refuses to carry non-proprietary programming,
shifts such programming to undesirable channel
locations or directly interferes with the quality of
the signal received by the subscriber, users and
regulators will assign blame to the operator. Subscribers may file complaints with the appropriate
authorities and exert pressure to halt the discrimination. '"I'

of the internet, commercial services were dominated by private networks that charged additional fees for communications with outside networks. Competition from ISPs willing to
provide access to the entire internet at a flat rate forced the
earlier proprietary networks to change their working models
so that flat-rate access to the public internet is now the norm
in the United States.
'16
See, e.g., Cable Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106
Stat. 1484 (1992) (identifying anticompetitive practices and
imposing a remedial statutory scheme).
137
See Letter from Jeffrey Chester for Media Education,
Mark Cooper, Consumer Federation of America, Gene Kimmelman, Consumers Union, Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Media Access Project, Patrice McDermott, OMB Watch, to William Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications
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These techniques, Quality of Service (QoS) and
caching, constitute accepted industry practice and
are not in and of themselves discriminatory. As explained below, however, they provide an opportunity to "crimp the hose" to outside content, slowing down information from the public internet
and speeding subscriber access to proprietary
content.
Given the vagaries of the internet, even sophisticated users would have difficulty noticing-let
alone proving-the existence of such discrimination. More likely, a user noticing that content
from an outside site takes far longer to download
than content from an @Home source will simply
use the @Home source without identifying the
reason for the delay. Because such discrimination
may prove virtually undetectable to the user, the
state has a strong First Amendment interest in taking prophylactic measures to prevent such discrimination.

could be limited using QoS to 50 kb/s (even
though the total internet bandwidth available
might allow every user to have 200 kb/s). This effectively limits that streaming video to a small window at a dozen frames per second (low quality,
jerky video). At the same time, cached streaming
video, unavailable at any price except to cable operator's chosen affiliates, comes to users at 1 mb/
s, allowing full screen, television-quality video. In
essence, cable companies have the ability to crimp
the hose based on whether content is viewed as
competitive in any manner.139

In support of these contentions, the consumer
groups submitted a document circulated by Cisco
Systems-the leading manufacturer of internet
networking equipment-at the National Cable
Television Association annual convention. The
document, titled Controlling Your Network: A Must
for Cable Operators, advises cable operators that it
can use the QoS controls on Cisco's equipment to
restrict the incoming push broadcasts [from competi-

1.

tors] as well as subscribers' outgoing access to push information site to discourage its use. At the same time,

QoS and Caching

As the consumer organizations described in the
their letter to Chairman Kennard,
First, the cable broadband networks can be intentionally manipulated to provide wide
bandwidth to the user for commercially affiliated
content, but significantly less bandwidth for generic and cable-unaffiliated internet traffic. One
might envision the bandwidth offered by the
cable modem network as a funnel, with the wide
end being last mile bandwidth and the narrow
end being the connection to the internet. The
cached content of the service provider affiliates is
located in the middle of the funnel, while nonaffiliated sites have no means to bypass the bottleneck. According to anecdotal accounts, cable
modem users typically have access to internet content at speeds below 200 kb/s while their access to
cached content is often at speeds exceeding 1
1 38
mb/s (5 times as fast).
Furthermore, using Quality of Service controls
(QoS), cable providers may discriminate against
non-affiliated content in even more distressing
ways. For example, non-cached streaming video
Commission (July 29, 1999), available at <www.cme.org/kennard.html> [hereinafter Consumer Letter].
138 Id.
139 See id. (footnotes omitted).
140

CISCO

SYSTEMS,

CONTROLLING

YOUR

NETWORK:

A

MUST FOR CABLE OPERATORS 5 (1999), as cited in Amicus Cu-

you could promote and offer your own partner's servof
ices with full-speed features to encourage adoption
1 40
your services, while increasing network efficiency.

@Home has already used this feature to reduce
the ability of subscribers to receive information.
Although @Home now claims not to enforce the
provision, it requires cable operators to limit
video streaming downloads by subscribers to ten
minutes or less. Contractual provisions also allow
cable operators to ban any other kind of con1
tent.1 4
Another opportunity to discriminate exists
through "caching" technology. Caching allows a
system manager to store content on its own
machine, so that the user need not spend time
14 2
downloading the content from the internet.
This speeds up the downloading time enormously, since the user will not perceive any delays
from general network congestion or from
problems at the generating site. The only limiting
factors are the subscriber's processor and the connection between the subscriber and the @Home
system.
This provides an obvious means of discriminatriae Brief of Citizens' Utility Board, et al., AT&T Corp. v. Port-

land, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999).
141
See Meeks, supra note 115.
142
See DIGITAL TORNADO, supra note 12, at 17 n.6; Consumer letter, supra note 137.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

ing in favor of one's own content, especially when
used in combination with QoS limitations.
@Home might, for example, offer cached video
services in combination with AT&T's cable systems that would appear to the subscriber at movie
quality, while using QoS to limit outside sites to
ten minutes ofjerky, stop-motion quality. Alternatively, AT&T and @Home could extract concessions from other content providers for such favored treatment. The past history of cable
143
television lends itself easily to such fears.
Finally, forcing subscribers to go through
@Home's system directly impacts the ability of
subscribers to receive information critical of
AT&T or @Home, or of anyone willing to pay for
the privilege of blocking a rival or critic. For example, if Ford Motor Company wished to discourage visitors to blueoval.com, a site which has published consumer information critical of Ford,
Ford could simply pay AT&T/@Home to use its
QoS controls to limit traffic to that particular site.
Again, cable's history in this regard shows that, absent requirements that systems carry content it
disfavors without interference, cable systems will
not hesitate to refuse to carry content it finds undesirable. '44
@Home in turn has denied that it intends to
discriminate against outside content. It has insisted to both the FCC and the courts that it provides "one-click" access to the content of the internet without any interference. 145 @Home claims
that it does not and will not enforce contract provisions limiting downloads to discriminate in favor
of its own content; rather, such controls are necessary to prevent a few customers from using all
available bandwidth to the detriment of other subscribers.' 4 6 Similarly, @Home states it will use its
caching technology to relieve network congestion,
not to give its own or its partners' offerings an anticompetitive advantage.

47

From a First Amendment point of view, however, the potential to discriminate and the incentive to do so warrant prophylactic action. 4 1 This

is particularly true in a legislative setting, as in City
of Portland. This deference does not evaporate,
even where intermediate scrutiny applies. 4

1
band alternatives is years away.

As

52

This lack of choice neutralizes the restraining
influences of the market and creates a significant
danger to the First Amendment rights of subscribers. As one internet expert explains,
It's important to be clear here. Cable operators aren't
filtering URLs to prevent customers from reaching unaffiliated content sites. The problem is that they
could-and users would have no alternative. The cable
operators wouldn't even have to be so blunt, because
their caching architecture allows some sites to receive
better treatment than others. Also, customers may not
be able to use new services, such as home servers, without @Home's blessing. Any ISP faces pressures to keep
customers in its1 53
own orbit, but users can normally vote
with their feet.

It is no response that @Home and AT&T have a
financial incentive to encourage network usage
and that this in turn provides the proper incentive
146

Sen. Ford).
144 For example, cable operators have refused to carry
ads for such rival services as DSL or DirecTV. See Advertising

148
149

Ban the Latest Salvo in Fight Over Internet Cable Access, LA
Oct. 5, 1999, at C4.

151

Id. at 195.
See supra notes 10, 12.

152

See

145 See AT&T/TCI Merger Order 14 FCC Rcd. at 3205,
para. 95; City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.

'

the Court stated in Turner I
Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where Congress must base its conclusions
upon substantial evidence, deference must be accorded to its findings as to the harm to be avoided
and to the remedial measures adopted for that
end, lest we infringe on traditional legislative au50
thority to make predictive judgments.
Given the potential for abuse, the difficulty of
detecting or preventing such abuse and the clear
incentive to discriminate in favor of one's own
proprietary content, it is difficult to conceive of
any other effective solution besides mandating
open, non-discriminatory access to competing
ISPs. Furthermore, without mandatory open access it is unclear how the market will properly discipline AT&T and @Home. Non-broadband connections, by their very nature, cannot provide
equivalent high-speed services, where discrimination would be most effective and most likely to
take place.' 5 ' Further, DSL has consistently
lagged behind cable in deployment to residential
customers, and the emergence of non-DSL broad-

143 See S. REP. No. 102-92 at 32-34 (1991); 138 CONG.
REC. S408-09, S428-30 (daily ed.Jan. 27, 1992) (statement of

TIMES,
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147

150

See generally Meeks, supra note 115.
See @Home Brief, supra note 41, at 5 of 11.
See Western Electric, 673 F. Supp. at 532.
Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 189.

BROADBAND TODAY,

supra note 13, at 20-21 (ex-

plaining the limitations of DSL).
153 WERBACH, supra note 10, at 6.
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to allow customers the broadest and most unfet-

nicate with virtually any other user . . . But the

tered use of the network. As Judge Greene recognized in requiring the RBOCs to observe the
FCC's open access requirements and limitations
on monopoly network operators in the nascent
field of "information services and electronic publishing,"

internet is more than just a common language.
The internet is a community, and users need to
156
move in and out of that community with ease.
Similarly, the courts have observed how the open
nature of the internet fosters the First Amendment's purpose of creating a true "marketplace of
ideas" where all can speak and hear equally regardless of financial resources or position in soci-

The Regional Companies argue at some length that
they have no incentive to discriminate against competitors in the information service market because to do so
would diminish use of the network and hence a reduction in their revenues. But in any market where Regional Companies are in competition with independent
information service providers, their economic interest
lies in manipulating the system toward their own serv-

ices, rather than in encouraging maximum use of the
network by their information service competitors . . .
That the ability for abuse exists as does the incentive, of

that there can be no doubt. As stated above, information services are fragile, and because of their fragility,
time sensitivity, and their negative reactions to even
small degradations in transmission quality and speed,
they are most easily subject
to destruction by those who
15 4
control transmission.

Cable operators clearly have both the ability
and the incentive to discriminate against outside
content and favor proprietary content. The danger this potential poses to a citizen's ability to access the free and open "marketplace of ideas" that
is the internet triggers the government's "affirmative role to encourage diversity of voices" by im55
posing structural safeguards upon the industry.
Accordingly, even if intermediate scrutiny applies,
an open access requirement withstands First
Amendment scrutiny.
C.

Defining the Internet Architecture

The existing network architecture for the internet is open: It is fully interactive and individuals move through it with ease. This, more than any
other factor, has contributed to the explosive
growth of the internet. As the FCC has acknowledged,
Every user that accesses the [i]nternet becomes
a part of it. The most important technical feature
of the internet is its openness, which allows any
user to develop new applications and to commu-

155

Western Electric, 673 F. Supp. at 565-66.
See S. REP. No. 102-92 at 50.

156

UNREGULATING THE INTERNET,

157

Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
DIGITAL ToRNADo, supra note 11, at 12 (explaining

154

158

supra note 12, at 5.

the interaction of the internet and the public switched telephone network).
159
See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238

ety.

15 7

While users take this openness for granted, it is
by no means either pre-ordained or assured. The
current openness and interoperability of the internet results from using the telephone network
as the base.' 581 Certain aspects of the telephone

network ensure this openness, for example, the
widespread penetration of the telephone network
and the low cost of use for individuals utilizing the
network. Additionally, the FCC mandates that the
phone system remain open: Any user of the network may attach devices to the network, such as
modems, without approval of the phone company, and anyone may provide service over the
1 59
network, including independent ISPs.

Yet this architecture is not written in stone. As
Kevin Werbach has noted, this version of the internet is "release 1.0," the first generally widespread commercial internet. 1 6 1 This in itself rep-

resented a change from the previous architecture,
characterized by Werbach as "release 0.9," in
which the government maintained the network. 161 This architecture will change again as the
internet moves from one geared toward dial-up
narrowband use to one geared toward always-on
62
broadband use.'
We therefore stand at the cross-roads in the
evolution of this next generation of the internet.
Not surprisingly, those offering broadband services have sought to shift the model from an open
and participatory internet to a closed network system favoring consumption of proprietary information. 16 3 Such behavior may not merely set the
model for a particular network, but for the future
of the internet as a whole.
F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Use of the Carterfone Device
in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968); UNREGULATING THE INTERNET, supra note 12, at 5.
16o See Werbach, supra note 10.
161
See id.
162
See id.
163 See id.
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Opponents of open access usually respond with
two objections to this scenario. First, they argue
that other broadband alternatives, notably DSL alternatives deployed by telephone companies, will
properly discipline cable and prevent the evolution of a closed network.1" 4 Second, they argue

that the FCC or other authorities retain the power
to intervene should a broadband monopoly does
develop.
Even assuming that alternative broadband technologies will emerge that are capable of competing with cable,'" 5 these objections do not address
the key concern that permitting closed networks
fundamentally alters the nature of the internet,
inhibiting First Amendment discourse and service
innovation. The First Amendment is not served by
reducing citizens to a choice of two or three
closed networks. If cable is permitted to remain
closed, it seems probable that other high-speed
service offerings, including DSL, will become
closed as well. "6
Second, as the consumer coalition noted in
their July 29 letter to Kennard, cable operators
may design their networks so that open access becomes physically impossible.'" 7 A recent report by
the FCC's Cable Bureau, generally opposed to
open access, noted this "troubling prospect."'" 8
Although observing that "[t]his is a charge the
Commission should take seriously," the report
concluded that no action was needed at this time,
but that "[i]f signs develop that cable is pursuing
a closed, proprietary network design, the Commission should take immediate and aggressive steps
9
to prevent this result."'6
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History does not support such optimism. To the
contrary, history demonstrates the wisdom of prophylactic action over remedial action. Consider,
for example, the tremendous cost associated with
the break up of AT&T's telephone monopoly,
which required years of litigation followed by a
painful process of restructuring. Similarly, neither
Congress nor the FCC has successfully reversed
the development of a highly concentrated, vertically integrated cable market. 170 By contrast, the
internet, which has heretofore evolved in an open
access regime with other protections from anticompetitive behavior in place, has prospered
and developed into a highly competitive, interactive and diverse medium of communication and
commerce.
Given the enormous First Amendment interest
in preserving the interactive quality of the internet, it is both understandable and consistent
with First Amendment jurisprudence for localities
such as Portland to take more aggressive action.
Even if intermediate scrutiny applies, the public's
interest in maintaining the continued health and
vitality of the internet is at least as strong as its
interest in maintaining the broadcast television industry. 171
V.

CONCLUSION

While the First Amendment protects both the
editorial discretion of a cable operator in choosing what package of video services to offer and the
proprietary content of an ISP, this does not automatically translate into a First Amendment right

164 See Advanced Services Report, 14 FCC Rcd. at 2423-26,
paras. 48-52.
165
The FCC has noted that non-DSL alternatives to
cable broadband are, at best, several years away from widespread deployment. See id. at 2430-31, para. 61. In addition,
although telephone companies and others have increasingly
deployed DSL to business customers, they have been slow to
offer such services to constmers. See id. at 2408, para. 26; see
also DIGITAL TORNADO, supra note 12, at 74 n.154.
166 Indeed, decisionmakers within the FCC have already
indicated that the existing open access requirements shotld
be reexamined and potentially loosened or eliminated
should other broadband services remain closed. See UNREGULATING THE INTERNET, supra note 12, at 25. As Chairman Ken-

that will only happen if every sector of the industry has
incentives to provide it: wireline, wireless and cable.
FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Remarks at the U.S.
Telecom Ass'n Annual Convention (Oct. 18, 1999).
107
See Constmer Letter, supra note 137.

nard stated,
I want to create an oasis from regulation in the broadband world, so that any company, using any technology,

Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 FCC Rcd. 24284, 24374-75
(1998).
171
Cf Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (applying intermediate
scrutiny to cable programming must-carry provision, but
finding that the preservation of local broadcast television is
an important governmental interest).

will have incentives to deploy broadband in an unregIlated or significantly deregulated environment. And that

does not mean just cable companies. We must have fast
and ubiquitous deployment of broadband services and

168

BROADBAND TODAY, supra note

13, at 43.

169" Id.; see also Esbin, supra note 12, at 104 ("If, in the
future, cable becomes the dominant means of high-speed,

broadband access to data networks and the internet, application of the traditional dominant/non-dominant analysis may

warrant a different regulatory response.").

171
In fact, cable markets have become even more concentrated since the attempt by Congress in 1992 to stem the

tide. See generally In re Annual Assessment of the Status of
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to offer internet access through one ISP to the exclusion of all others. As an initial matter, it is unclear if offering internet access is a form of cable
service or simply a neutral telecommunications
service, where the network provider traditionally
has had no right to exclude others.
Even if the internet can be classified as a cable
service, it is unclear whether any First Amendment right is implicated. Assuming that permitting a subscriber a choice of access provider does
not deprive the cable operator of other channels,
it would appear that the rationale of Turnersimply
does not apply. Nothing in open access interferes
with the "repertoire of services" that the cable operator wishes to offer, the subscriber will still receive the full range and mix of speech that the
cable operator-in the exercise of its editorial discretion-wish to communicate. What the cable
operator loses is simply the ability to deny access to
other's speech. Nothing in the First Amendment
guarantees a speaker the right to drown out
others. Indeed, such a right would be antithetical
to the purpose of the First Amendment and to
172

See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 138.

trends in First Amendment case law. 172
Even assuming that editorial discretion encompasses the right to block access to the speech of
others, this right must yield before a compelling
governmental purpose. Here, open access provides citizens with access to information and a forum in which they may speak freely to anyone
who will listen. Without open access, broadband
providers may well become "media gatekeepers,"
capable of slanting information for commercial or
ideological reasons. Worse, the ability to restrict
choice and access to the internet threatens the
open and democratic process that has made the
internet a "unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication."'

7 3

Requiring open access, therefore, serves what
the Supreme Court has termed a governmental
purpose of the highest order-facilitating the
public's First Amendment rights. It would prove
ironic indeed if AT&T were correct that a cable
company's right to deny speech could trump the
government's right to have its citizens receive
speech.
173

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

